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THE POST-MERGER EQUITY VALUE PERFORMANCE OF 
ACQUIRING FIRMS IN THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY 
Atul Sheel 
and 
Amit Nagpal 
ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates long run equity value performance of acquiring firms 
in the hospitality industry. The performance analysis has been done using the Jen- 
sen Measure Model and the Market Model. The study shows significantly negative 
equity value performance of the acquiring hospitality firms at least for the period 
1980-2000. As such, the impact of mergers and acquisitions on equity value of 
acquiring firms in the hospitality industry is better understood. 
Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions have grown into an important subject for finance research- 
ers today. Some argue that acquisitions have increased firm value and efficiency, moved 
resources to their highest and best uses, and, thereby, have increased shareholder's value 
(Jensen 1984). Others argue that the post acquisition performance of acquired firms does 
not improve (Magenheim & Mueller, 1988; Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1988). Yet another 
view is that acquisition activity represents machinations of speculators who reflect the 
frenzy of a "Casino Society" (Rohatyn, 1986). This speculative activity increased debt 
unduly in the latter part of the 1980s, and eroded equity resulting in an economy highly 
vulnerable to economic instability. 
Background 
Weston, Chung, and Hoag (1990) have explained the merger phenomenon using sev- 
eral different rationales: 
1. The differential efficiency rationale states that if the management of firm A is 
more efficient than the management of B, and if A acquires 8, the efficiency of 
B is brought up to the efficiency level of firm A. 
I 2. The operating synergy rationale states that a major motivation for mergers and 
I 
L acquisitions is the resulting operating synergy that represents a form of econ- 
i 
L omy of scale. Such economies, in turn, may lead to better utilization of capacity 
i after the merger. 
I 
3. The financial synergy rationale states that mergers and acquisitions can poten- 
tially lower the cost of capital function by influencing the bankruptcy costs and 
such other factors. 
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4. The under valuation rationale states that certain firms that are undervalued 
become attractive targets for other firms because the replacement cost of assets 
acquired is less than the building cost of those assets. 
5. The agency problem rationale states that in firms with major agency problems, 
the owners look forward to external arrangements (takeovers, etc.) to mitigate 
such costs. 
6. The winner's curse-hubris rationale states that in many takeovers, the higher 
valuation of the bidder (over the target's true economic value) results from the 
bidder's excessive self-confidence (or pride and arrogance). 
6. The tax rationale states that many mergers and acquisitions are induced by tax 
considerations. Whether such considerations induce mergers depends on the 
availability of alternative methods of achieving equivalent tax benefits. 
In the 1980s, most empirical research on mergers focused on the short run effects (daily 
equity returns surrounding the announcement date) on the equity value of the target and 
the acquiring firm. Such studies generally showed that target equity holders earned sig- 
nificantly positive abnormal returns, and that the acquiring firm equity holders earned 
little or no abnormal returns (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Asquith, 1983). In the 1990s, how- 
ever, researchers looked more at the long run (one to five years) post merger equity 
returns of acquiring firms. The findings of such long run studies have been divided. 
Some document statistically significant negative abnormal returns for stockholders of 
acquiring firms over a five-year post-merger period (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker, 1992). 
Others suggest no significant abnormal returns and also show that past research findings 
on post-merger equity-value performance are influenced by benchmark selection errors 
(Frank, Harris & Titman, 1991). Some studies suggest that acquiring firms experience sig- 
nificantly negative abnormal returns over one to three years, but experience positive 
returns in the fourth and fifth years (Loderer & Martin, 1992). Others also suggest the 
influence of other factors (cash/stock tender offers, ownership trends and such others) 
on post-merger abnormal common equity returns (Loughran & Vijh, 1997; Chang, 1998). 
Research on Mergers and Acquisitions in the Hospitality Industry 
Although the phenomenon of mergers has been examined by a plethora of studies in 
the conventional framework, very few researchers have addressed the merger and 
acquisition trends in the hospitality industry. Andrew (1988) showed that the acquiring 
hospitality firms lost value during the 20 days prior to the announcement of the acquisi- 
tion. The same study also showed that the target firms, on the other hand, gained value 
during the same period, but the size of the additional wealth gained was skewed 
upwards. Kwansa (1994) estimated the size of the additional wealth earned by the equity 
holders of lodging companies acquired in the 1980s. The total and cumulative average 
residuals were calculated based on the portfolio of 18 target companies and an event 
window of 61 trading days. The results showed that the bulk of additional wealth was 
created two days before and after the announcement of an acquisition. The total cumula- 
tive average residual for the target hotel companies was found to be 31.5%. 
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While these studies have examined the short run influence of mergers on equity 
value, the long run impact of mergers on the equity returns of acquiring firms in the hos- 
pitality industry has been relatively ignored. This research addresses such a deficiency 
and strives to broaden the relatively small literature base on mergers and acquisitions 
within the hospitality industry. 
Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to test the long-term effect of acquisition on the equity 
value of acquiring firms in the hospitality industry. 
Research Hypothesis 
The research accomplishes its objective by testing the following hypothesis: 
:m & = The process of acquisition does not eflect the equity value of the acquiringfirms in the long 
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excess return on the excess return of a benchmark portfolio (Frank, 1991) provides an 
appropriate measure of merger performance. The monthly returns of acquiring firms for 
36 months beginning the month after the final bid were converted to excess returns by 
subtracting the yield on one month Treasury Bills. The market returns for respective 
period were also converted to excess market returns. The following equations were used: 
r)t =qt - r-t t = 1, 2 ,..., 36, 
r',t =r,t - rft t = 1, 2 ,..., 36, 
where 
r)t = excess return for company j in month t 
r--jt = equity holder return for company j in month t 
y = yield on one month U.S. Treasury bills 
r',t = excess return on market index rn in month t 
r,t = return on market index rn in month t 
t = month relative to final bid date ( t = 0 is the event month) 
The regression of the excess equity returns (rIt) and the excess market returns (r',t) was 
run and the intercept was obtained for each acquirer j by using the equation: 
rSt = 9 + 4. rjmt + ~ j t  
where 
~ j t  = random error with mean zero 
9 = intercept for company j measuring abnormal performance 
4. = sensitivity coefficient of company j to market index 
The t-test statistics and the p values were obtained for each firm. A cross-sectional 
analysis in event time was done by calculating the mean of the intercept (9) and the 
mean of the t-test statistic. 
Market Model 
As explained by Brown and Warner (1985), the first step in measuring the effect on 
stock value of an "event" (announcement of an acquisition) is to define an event win- 
dow/period. The event window is the period containing the "event" for which the 
abnormal returns are calculated. The study covered the period from six months before to 
36 months after the announcement date as the event window. A clean period, far 
removed from the announcement date, was chosen to calculate the parameters (a and p) 
for finding the estimated returns. In line with existent event study procedures, the period 
from 36 to seven months before the announcement date was considered the clean period. 
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As shown in equations 1 and 2, monthly returns of 10 acquiring firms for the clean 
period and the event period were converted to excess returns by subtracting the yield 
on one month Treasury Bills. The market returns for respective periods were also con- 
verted to excess market returns. The abnormal returns were calculated per the following 
equation: 
Ajt = Rjt- Wt t = -6,-5 ,... 0, 1 ,..., 36 I 
where 1 
Ajt is the abnormal return for a given security j for month t 
Rjt is the actual or observed risk free return for the event period, as given in 
equation 1 
- 
Rjt is the estimated return for the event period, gven by 
Rjt = + pj k m t  
where 
ajis the intercept for company j calculated from the clean period. 
pj is the sensitivity coefficient of company j to market index, obtained from the 
clean period. 
- 
Rmt is the market return from equally weighted market index. 
For each month in the event period, the abnormal returns (Ajt) were averaged across 
firms to produce the average residual for that month, ARt, where ARt = &, and N is 
N 
the number of firms in the sample. The average residuals were accumulated for each 
month over the entire event period to produce the cumulative residual, CAR, for the 
-6 
event period where CAR = ZAR~ 
t = 36 
The cumulative average represents the average total effect of the event across all 
firms. 
Findings and Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the findings relevant to the Jensen Measure analysis for all major 
acquiring hospitality firms (transaction size greater that $7.5 million) during the 
1980-2000 period. 
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MONTH 
Table 2 
Cumulative average residual for the event period 
ARt 
-0.30 
-3.55 
-4.67 
3.62 
-3.70 
-6.00 
-3.39 
1.13 
-6.97 
-9.19 
-9.64 
0.46 
-2.24 
-11 -07 
-7.33 
-3.90 
-9.71 
0.00 
-7.39 
-2.95 
-5.44 
-4.07 
5.20 
-7.00 
3.40 
-4.08 
-0.74 
-12.13 
0.52 
-5.28 
-3.73 
-11.57 
3.68 
-4.24 
-4.18 
-1.26 
6.65 
-7.62 
1 .oo 
-9.72 
-14.26 
-9.63 
-5.36 
t-statistic 
-0.05 
-0.42 
-0.81 
1.23 
-0.80 
-1.36 
-2.30 
-1.16 
-3.30 
-2.22 
-1.86 
0.26 
-2.13 
2.70 
-0.28 
-0.89 
-1.07 
0.60 
-3.67 
-0.73 
-1.22 
0.10 
-1.85 
-0.08 
-0.24 
0.66 
-1.24 
0.79 
-1.06 
-1.52 
-0.58 
-1.27 
0.00 
-1.15 
-1.21 
-1.35 
-1.32 
-0.45 
0.11 
-1.52 
-1.32 
-0.95 
0.21 
CAR 
-0.30 
-3.85 
-8.52 
-4.90 
-8.60 
-14.60 
-17.99 
-16.86 
-23.83 
-33.02 
-42.66 
-42.20 
-44.45 
-55.52 
-62.85 
-66.75 
-76.46 
-76.46 
-83.85 
-86.79 
-92.23 
-96.30 
-91.10 
-98.10 
-94.69 
-98.77 
-99.52 
-111.65 
-111.13 
-116.41 
-120.14 
-131.71 
-128.03 
-132.27 
-136.45 
-137.71 
-131.06 
-138.69 
-137.69 
-147.41 
-161.67 
-171.30 
-176.67 
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As shown in Table 2, the negative insignificant abnormal returns in the period six 
months before the announcement (-6 to -1) suggest that the acquiring hospitality firms 
neither gain nor lose in the short run. Such a finding is consistent with the findings of 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Andrew (1988). A small positive abnormal return in the 
first month after the announcement period suggests the introduction of possible biases 
due to market speculation. The significant negative CAR of -176.67 in Table 2 suggests 
that the equity values of acquiring firms show significant negative returns in the long run 
after the a~~uisit i0n.l  
Conclusion 
This study investigates the impact of merger and acquisition activity on long run 
equity value performance of acquiring firms in the hospitality industry. The study ana- 
lyzes the performance of acquiring firms using the Jensen Measure Model and the abnor- 
mal returns generated by the Market Model. Findings relevant to the Jensen Measure 
analysis are suggestive of the fact that, at least for the 1980-2000 period, the equity value 
for acquiring hospitality firms declined in the long run. Such results were consistent with 
the findings of Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) and Loughran and Vijh (1997). On 
the one hand, the analysis of abnormal returns suggests that during the test period, 
acquiring hospitality firms neither gained nor lost in the short run. Such a finding is con- 
sistent with the findings of Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Andrew (1988). The small posi- 
tive abnormal return in the first month after the announcement period -is indicative of 
possible introduction of biases due to market speculation. On the other hand, the signifi- 
cant negative Cumulative Abnormal Residuals (CARS) for the acquiring hospitality firms 
(-176.37) suggest significant negative post-acquisition equity returns for these firms in 
the long run, and further corroborates the results of the Jensen Measure analysis. 
Limitations 
Due to a small sample size and limited availability of data, the study could not con- 
trol for various factors such as the relative size of target and acquiring firms, the type of 
benchmark portfolio used, the medium of exchange (stock versus cash offers), and the 
type of merger. Also, the results for REITs and other hotel companies are not calculated 
separately. This study suggests that future researchers address such limitations when 
investigating the phenomenon of mergers and acquisitions in the hospitality industry. 
Finally, it must be mentioned that the results of this study are specific to acquiring firms 
only and do not consider the total wealth generated by the merger. Consequently, any 
interpretation of the research findings warrants additional care and a recognition of such 
limitations. 
The negative long run abnormal return in equity value is confined only to the acquiring 
firms and does not suggest that the total wealth created by the merger is negative. There may be a 
gain in the equity value of the target firms that may offset the loss of acquiring firms, hence the 
total market capitalization after the merger may be more than that of before. 
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